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_____________ 
 
No. 16-1297 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SCHIRMER MONESTIME 
Appellant 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  2-14-cr-00618-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 7, 2016 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 27, 2017) 
 
____________ 
 
O P I N I O N* 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 This appeal stems from a drug-trafficking conspiracy that took place in Elizabeth, 
New Jersey, from January through March of 2013.  Three individuals were caught in the 
operation:  Bobby Lewis, who pled guilty, Joseph “Clifford” Jacques, who got away, and 
Appellant Schirmer Monestime, who was convicted by a jury for one count of drug-
trafficking conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.  The District Court 
subsequently sentenced Monestime to 63 months’ imprisonment and three years’ 
supervised release.  By this appeal, Monestime argues that the District Court committed 
three errors by:  (1) denying Monestime’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence; (2) 
denying Monestime’s post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a 
new trial; and (3) denying Monestime a mitigating role adjustment during sentencing.  
For the reasons explained below, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling as to all three 
of Monestime’s claims.  
I.   
The following sequence of events came to light through testimony at Monestime’s 
suppression hearing and trial.   
In January 2013, Jacques offered Lewis $500 to accept a package mailed from 
Haiti to Elizabeth, New Jersey.  Lewis, who did not specifically know that the package 
was supposed to contain nearly three kilograms of cocaine, agreed on the condition that 
the package be sent to a different person’s attention at a building where Lewis’s aunt 
lived.  Jacques later notified Lewis that the package would be delivered in mid-February.  
A Government investigation found that Jacques also notified Monestime, who had 
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accepted Jacques’s offer to be a “contractor” for the package.  The package was 
ultimately returned to Haiti because Lewis did not arrive at the mailing address in time. 
Later in February, Jacques told Lewis that the package was being reshipped, and 
they agreed that this time it would be sent to Lewis’s attention at his aunt’s address.  But 
when the package reached the Port of Miami, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) officials discovered that it contained six framed paintings with cocaine secreted 
inside the frames.  The CBP officials alerted Department of Homeland Security 
Investigations (“HSI”) agents based in Newark, New Jersey, about the discovery, and the 
HSI agents decided to set up a controlled delivery to the original destination in Elizabeth.  
When the package arrived in Newark, HSI agents retrieved nearly three kilograms of 
cocaine and constructed new frames for the paintings that they packed with fake cocaine.  
The agents then planned the controlled delivery of the package to Lewis’s aunt’s address 
in Elizabeth, with over 15 agents assigned to the area to conduct surveillance.   
On March 4, 2013, Monestime drove Jacques, who was seated in the front 
passenger seat, to pick up Lewis, and the three of them continued to Lewis’s aunt’s 
address in Elizabeth, where Lewis was dropped off to wait for the package.  Lewis 
testified that he retrieved the package (unaware that the mail carrier was actually an 
undercover postal inspector) and, following Jacques’s instructions, walked with it to a 
nearby Bank of America parking lot after unwittingly passing surveilling agents along the 
way.  Once at the parking lot, Lewis called Jacques to let him know where he was, and 
Monestime, still with Jacques, drove to him.  Lewis waved toward them when they 
arrived, and Monestime and Jacques circled the parking lot.  They then exited the bank 
4 
 
parking lot, driving past Lewis and an unmarked van of law enforcement agents.  One of 
those agents, James McDermott, testified that while in the van, he learned from other 
surveilling agents in real time about the call and wave.  McDermott testified that these 
events – accepting a package and then immediately bringing it to a parking lot and 
making a phone call; a car subsequently driving around a bank parking lot without 
conducting a transaction; the package recipient waving toward that car – had raised his 
suspicion at the time.   
Meanwhile, Lewis left the parking lot and took the package back to his aunt’s 
home.  The agents drove after Monestime and Jacques.  Monestime testified that Jacques 
then asked him to pull over, at which point Jacques exited, his cell phone fell on the 
ground, and Jacques fled.  Though McDermott did not see Jacques exit the car, he 
testified that he saw the door on the front passenger’s side open and close, making him 
suspicious that someone had fled on foot.  The agents then drove closer to Monestime, 
who immediately drove away, making several consecutive turns.  McDermott testified 
that Monestime’s driving signaled to him and the other agents that Monestime was 
engaging in counter-surveillance, prompting them to pull Monestime over and order him 
out of his vehicle.   
McDermott also testified that after the stop but before the arrest, he saw in plain 
view in the console a cell phone that appeared to be missing its battery and SIM card, a 
counter-surveillance tactic that McDermott testified is often employed by individuals in 
narcotics investigations.  Monestime, according to McDermott’s testimony, told 
McDermott that the cell phone was his but had been in the car for months and that he had 
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not used it that day.  McDermott testified that Monestime told him he worked at a nearby 
YMCA but did not have his work ID, and that he asked Monestime about his Haitian 
nationality because when trafficking drugs, people “typically” receive packages from 
their country of origin.  Agent McDermott next arrested Monestime, searched the cell 
phone for recent calls and contacts, and brought Monestime to HSI headquarters in 
Newark for processing.  Monestime later told McDermott, and ultimately testified, that 
the cell phone actually belonged to Jacques.   
After interviewing Monestime at the station, Agent McDermott showed 
Monestime a photo array that contained photographs of six men, one of whom was 
named Clifford Jacques but was not the Jacques who had fled from Monestime’s van in 
the parking lot.  Monestime circled that man’s photograph and (mis)identified him as 
Jacques.  The same day it realized the error, the Government alerted Monestime that the 
man he had selected was not his co-conspirator.   
A federal grand jury indicted Monestime on a single count of drug-trafficking 
conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.  Monestime timely moved to 
suppress his post-arrest statements and the evidence seized from him and his vehicle, 
particularly the cell phone, arguing that they were the fruits of an illegal arrest. The 
District Court denied Monestime’s suppression motion.   
A jury convicted Monestime following a four-day trial, and Monestime timely 
moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial.  The District Court denied that motion.  
At sentencing, Monestime objected to the sentencing range calculated in the Presentence 
Report and argued that he was entitled to a two-level mitigating role reduction.  
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Monestime emphasized his role in the conspiracy relative to Lewis’s because Lewis had 
received a two-level mitigating role reduction when sentenced by another judge.  The 
District Court overruled Monestime’s objection and sentenced him to 63 months’ 
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.  Monestime timely appealed.  
II.  
 We now turn to Monestime’s three claims.1   
A.  Motion to Suppress 
 Monestime’s motion to suppress averred that McDermott lacked probable cause to 
arrest him and reasonable suspicion to stop him.  Therefore, Monestime argued, all of his 
post-arrest statements and all of the evidence seized from him and from his car should 
have been suppressed.  Monestime reiterates these arguments on appeal, adding that the 
District Court applied the wrong standard in finding the arrest lawful.  Appellant’s Br. 22.  
We disagree.  
 We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to 
the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review of its application of the law to 
those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  “This review is 
more deferential with respect to determinations about the credibility of witnesses, and 
when the district court’s decision is based on testimony that is coherent and plausible, not 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This 
Court has jurisdiction over Monestime’s challenge to his conviction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and over Monestime’s challenge to his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a). 
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internally inconsistent and not contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never 
be a finding of clear error.”  United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 The Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause support a warrantless arrest.   
U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] 
warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where 
there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being 
committed.”).  “Probable cause to arrest exists when the information within the arresting 
officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest is sufficient to warrant a reasonable law 
enforcement officer to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the 
person to be arrested.”  Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000).  The 
contours of the probable cause standard are well-established:  it is a “practical, 
nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. . . . [It] is a 
fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”  Maryland v. Pringle, 
540 U.S. 366, 370–71 (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  “While probable 
cause to arrest requires more than mere suspicion, the law recognizes that probable cause 
determinations have to be made ‘on the spot’ under pressure and do ‘not require the fine 
resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance 
standard demands.’”  Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d at 436 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 121 (1975)).  Importantly, probable cause assesses “not whether particular conduct 
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is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of 
non-criminal acts.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). 
 Even without probable cause, “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”  United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 
350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000).  “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 
probable cause.”  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
 We find that the District Court applied the correct standard when assessing 
Monestime’s warrantless arrest, and agree that McDermott had probable cause to arrest 
Monestime.2  The District Court correctly noted that “the standard to determine whether 
probable cause existed is certainly not beyond that of a reasonable doubt, which is what a 
trial would require.”  S.A. 73; see also Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (“Finely tuned standards 
such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . have 
no place in the [probable-cause] decision.” (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)).  It also correctly acknowledged its obligation “to look at the totality of the 
                                              
2   Though the District Court considered McDermott’s post-stop observation of the 
cell phone in finding probable cause, we note that there may well have been probable 
cause even before that based on Monestime’s counter-surveillance driving tactics.  See 
United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743–44 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding probable cause 
where defendant “acted furtively,” “employed counter-surveillance techniques,” and 
“became nervous when engaged in conversation by two detectives” even though drug-
sniffing dogs did not alert to defendant’s suitcase); see also United States v. Soto, 375 
F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[E]vidence of counter-surveillance may support a 
finding of probable cause.”); United States v. Payne, 119 F.3d 637, 642–43 (8th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. 
Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 729 (1st Cir. 1995).    
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circumstances” and “[w]hat the officers knew at the time of the stop, and the arrest.”  
S.A. 73.   
 Assessing McDermott’s testimony at the pre-trial suppression hearing, the District 
Court found that “what the officers could have reasonably believed at the time is also 
supported by the testimony given by Agent McDermott, which is that [he] believed that 
[Monestime] was doing evasive maneuvers and that he had in fact detected that he was 
being followed by law enforcement.”  S.A. 75.  The District Court appropriately 
considered McDermott’s post-stop observation of the cell phone – finding that “it was 
certainly valid that in [McDermott’s] training and experience, it was consistent with a 
person who’s possibly looking to avoid detection and/or somehow to avoid being linked 
to some type of activity” – before concluding that “there was probable cause for the 
arrest.”  Id. at 75–76.  The information that McDermott personally observed and learned 
in real time following the controlled delivery established more than enough probable 
cause for McDermott to arrest Monestime, let alone sufficient reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to stop him.3   
 As the District Court noted, the only basis Monestime alleges for suppressing his 
post-arrest statements is the arrest itself.  Id. at 76.  Because we find that Agent 
McDermott had probable cause to arrest Monestime, that claim also fails.   
                                              
3 Though Monestime rebuts McDermott’s suspicions with explanations of his 
behavior, he cannot overcome the well-settled principle that “[a] determination that 
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”  
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); see also United States v. Ubiles, 224 
F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may be 
formed by observing exclusively legal activity.”). 
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 We disagree with Monestime that the District Court should have suppressed all 
evidence obtained from McDermott’s warrantless search of the recent calls and contacts 
on the cell phone found on the console.4  Though the Supreme Court held in Riley v. 
California that “a warrant is generally required . . . even when a cell phone is seized 
incident to arrest,” 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014), that decision was issued over a year 
after the search at issue in this case.  At the time of his search, McDermott relied in good 
faith on then-agency practice to “search incident to arrest any phones to determine if 
there [were] other co-conspirators in the area, and . . . to know anybody that [had] been 
communicated with regarding the delivery.”  S.A. 28–29; cf. United States v. Katzin, 769 
F.3d 163, 182 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (concluding that when agents act “upon an 
objectively reasonable good faith belief in the legality of their conduct,” the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule applies).  Alternatively, the independent source 
doctrine cuts against suppression:  the Government eventually obtained a search warrant 
for the cell phone, and there has been no showing that the initial warrantless search 
affected the warrant application.  See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 243 (3d Cir. 
2011).    
                                              
4 We question Monestime’s standing to bring his claim about that cell phone in the 
first instance.  Monestime said during the suppression hearing and at trial that the cell 
phone was not his.  McDermott testified that Monestime told him he did not use the cell 
phone on the day in question, and that it had been in the vehicle for months.  Monestime 
therefore does not have a Fourth Amendment-protected interest in this cell phone.  See 
United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81 (1993) (per curiam) (“It has long been a rule 
that a defendant can urge the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment only if that defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated by the challenged search or seizure.”); see also Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (Fourth Amendment rights “may not be vicariously asserted.”). 
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 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Monestime’s pre-trial 
suppression motion in its entirety.  
B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial 
 Following his guilty verdict, Monestime moved for a judgment of acquittal under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) or, in the alternative, a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.  The 
District Court denied the motion, and we affirm.  Monestime urges that the Government 
fabricated evidence in the course of its investigation.  We need not revisit this argument 
at length.  
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant or denial of a Rule 29 
motion, applying the same standard as the District Court.  See United States v. 
Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 348 (3d Cir. 2014).  In doing so, we “review the record in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available 
evidence.”  Id.  (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  “The burden on a defendant 
who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high.”  Id.  (citation 
omitted).  We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion.  
Id. at 346. 
 Both Rules 29 and 33 set forth particularly difficult standards.  Under Rule 29, 
“only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which 
the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the 
verdict.”  United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 156 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
Under Rule 33, the District Court “can order a new trial on the ground that the jury’s 
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verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence only if it believes that there is a serious 
danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred—that is, that an innocent person has 
been convicted.”  United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  
 Monestime uses the Government’s error in compiling the photo array to contend 
that “federal agents fabricated evidence in the course of its investigation.”  Appellant’s 
Br. 25.  He argues that the Government’s “blatant fabrication of evidence tainted [its] 
entire case and called in to serious question the integrity of any remaining evidence 
within the custody and control of the investigating agents.”  Id. at 26.  As the District 
Court noted, such arguments “relat[ing] to some type of manipulation of evidence” were 
“raised at the time of trial” and “could have been and more than likely were considered 
by the jury.”  S.A. 519; see also Salahuddin, 765 F.3d at 348 (“[Defendant’s] arguments 
about credibility and challenges to portions of the Government’s evidence were made to 
the jury, who were free to reject them.”).  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s 
denial of the motion.  
C. Sentencing 
 Lastly, Monestime contests the District Court’s calculation of his sentencing range 
under the Guidelines, arguing that he was entitled to a two-point reduction for a minor 
role pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).  The District Court considered and rejected this 
argument.  We review that finding for clear error.  United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 
200 (3d Cir. 2012).  “A decision is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the 
definite and firm conviction based on all the evidence that the trial court made a 
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mistake[,]” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 351 (3d Cir. 2002), but “[w]here there 
are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot 
be clearly erroneous.”  United States v. Waterman, 755 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).  We find that the District 
Court’s determination was not clearly erroneous.  
 The Sentencing Guidelines permit the downward adjustment of a defendant’s 
offense level if the defendant was “substantially less culpable than the average participant 
in the criminal activity.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3.  Specifically, the Mitigating Role 
provision states in relevant part:  “If the defendant was a minor participant in any 
criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).  “In determining whether 
this adjustment is warranted, we have instructed district courts to consider such factors as 
the nature of the defendant’s relationship to other participants, the importance of the 
defendant’s actions to the success of the venture, and the defendant’s awareness of the 
nature and scope of the criminal enterprise.”  Self, 681 F.3d at 201 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  “We have also observed that ‘[t]he district courts are allowed broad 
discretion in applying this section, and their rulings are left largely undisturbed by the 
courts of appeal.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 238 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
 Lewis, the co-conspirator who pled guilty and testified against Monestime, 
received a two-level mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) when sentenced 
by another judge.  In his brief, Monestime emphasizes a number of similarities between 
himself and Lewis, and aims to establish that he was not “any more aware of the scope 
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and structure of the conspiracy than Lewis[,]” ultimately concluding that “[t]he only real 
difference [between the two men] is that Lewis pled guilty and [Monestime] elected to go 
to trial.”  Appellant’s Br. 29–30.  Even accepting Monestime’s argument that he and 
Lewis were equally culpable – or that Monestime was less culpable – it cannot be said 
that the District Court erred, much less clearly erred, in denying Monestime a mitigating 
role adjustment.5  “[T]he mere fact that a defendant was less culpable than his co-
defendants does not entitle the defendant to ‘minor participant’ status as a matter of law.”  
United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 2001).  Monestime has neither made 
any showing that he was “substantially” less involved than Lewis, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. 
n.3, nor left us with the “definite and firm conviction based on all the evidence that the 
trial court made a mistake.”  Perez, 280 F.3d at 351.  Accordingly, we affirm the District 
Court’s sentence.  
III. 
 In summary, for all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Monestime’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence; denial of Monestime’s 
motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial; and denial of a 
mitigating role adjustment during sentencing.  
                                              
5 We agree with the District Court’s observation during sentencing that 
Monestime’s explanations for his incriminating behavior “strain[] credibility.”  S.A. 539.  
In any event, “the District Court is under no obligation to accept as true the defendant’s 
own characterization of his role in the criminal scheme” or “attribute to them any 
particular evidentiary weight.”  United States v. Rodriguez, 342 F.3d 296, 299, 300 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
